Week 2: Democratic Citizenship and Collective Action

POLSCI 116

Last week

Intro and high-level concepts

This week

Some fundamentals:

  • Are citizens capable of democracy?
  • What is the social contract?
  • What is collective action and why is it both challenging and necessary?

Quick Housekeeping

Writing/length on quizzes – less is more!

Information and Democracy

Citation

Much of today’s discussion comes from Chapter One of What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), which I almost had you read.

This is a very brief overview of specific strands of political thought, used for a specific purpose. Take political theory classes!

But first…

Pop quiz (not graded, don’t worry…but don’t look the answers up):

A Democratic Paradox

Democracy relies on citizens using information to make choices.

But! Citizens are notorious for their ignorance.


“The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.” - Churchill

A Democratic Paraox

A Democratic Paradox

Classic and early-modern philosophers looked down on what we would recognize as democracy as rule by some combination of:

  • the mob
  • the poor
  • the incompetent

If left to our own devices, we’d vote ourselves into oblivion.

A Democratic Paradox

Quick show of hands: can you name your home-district member of Congress?


What about your home-district state senator?

A Democratic Paradox

And yet, people tend to value democracy as a form of government and it’s done pretty well over the last couple of centuries.

Why this matters

Why do proponents of democracy think it’s better than the alternatives?

  • Fundamental right to self-determination
  • Aggregation of private interests promotes the public good
  • Democratic citizenship is self-actualizing for democratic citizens

Why this matters

But this only works if citizens have sufficient information and capacity to:

  • Be aware of and understand relevant issues
  • Know what they (should) want
  • Reason together about what we should do

Why this matters

Mass ignorance leaves three options:

  • Reject democracy
  • Limit the scope of self-determination
  • Strengthen democratic citizenship

Expectations of Democratic Citizenship

Last week I said that democracy isn’t binary. Let’s take a second to unpack that.

Democratic theories vary in how much they expect of democratic citizens.

Strong Democracy for the Few

Early democracy in Athens involved “thick” democratic citizenship.

Democratic citizens were expected to deliberate on public matters, serve in public offices, and hold administrative responsibilities...though citizenship was strictly limited.

Strong Democracy for the Few

Socrates and Plato were extremely skeptical that even these highly-engaged citizens would be capable of self-rule.

Strong Democracy for the Few

Aristotle was a bit more optimistic, but his “polity” (not to be confused with “democracy”) was still elitist.

Core idea: government should promote the common good, and citizens who aren’t necessarily philosophers can reason together toward it...though some will be naturally better at this than others.

Strong Democracy for the Few

These ideas heavily informed the Roman republic.

Fast forwarding…

I’m going to skip a lot of history of democracy.


What we’re after is how classical theories of democratic citizenship link up with modern theories of democratic citizenship.

The Social Contract

Someone tell me the basic idea behind the social contract.

Escaping the State of Nature

The core problem is that humans begin in the state of nature

  • “war of all against all”
  • life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”

Hobbes’s Leviathan

State of Nature as Prisoner’s Dilemma

P2 Cooperates P2 Fights
P1 Cooperates 2,2 0,3
P1 Fights 3,0 1,1

P1’s ranking:

  • P1 exploits P2
  • Peace
  • War
  • P2 exploits P1

P2’s ranking:

  • P2 exploits P1
  • Peace
  • War
  • P1 exploits P2

Peace is Pareto optimal (no alternative makes everyone better off)

War is equilibrium (no alternative is individually rational)

Collective Action Problem (Preview)

The prisoner’s dilemma is a type of collective action problem, or situation where individually rational decisions produce socially sub-optimal outcomes.

Tend to emerge with respect to public/collective goods, such as peace/security

  • but also pollution, academic peer review, group assignments, party planning…

We’ll expand on this next class

Judge a Book by Its Cover

“A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one…And if the representative consist of many men, the voice of the greater number, must be considered as the voice of them all.” (Leviathan, Part 1, chapter 16)

Hobbes’s Leviathan

The Social Contract

The social contract is an (implicit) agreement to trade some freedom for cooperation-enforcing institutions.

Those institutions:

  • exist to preserve private rights (safety, e.g.)
  • derive their authority from the people

Context on Hobbes

Heavily influenced by the English Civil War, which resulted in the execution of King Charles I.

This led him to a…minimalist social contract.

Citizens can revoke the social contract if the Leviathan fails to keep them out of the state of nature.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

The goal of the social contract is to escape the state of nature – much lower aspirations than the Greeks’ interest in the common good.

But we can do better than merely preserving our safety.

The social contract broadly protects life, liberty, and property, but places few expectations on citizens beyond their self interest.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

The goal of the social contract is to escape the state of nature – much lower aspirations than the Greeks’ interest in the common good.

Both of these perspectives emphasize hierarchy in ability (to reason to decisions, to accumulate property).

For Locke these hierarchies likely go together.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

This makes elections useful for two things:

  • Select high ability citizens as representatives
  • Check their power / throw them out if necessary

This offers a “thin” model of democratic citizenship. All it asks is that you vote once in a while to protect your private interest.

But it is extended to more people, since more people have something to lose in the state of nature.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

The early utilitarians make this explicit

Relaxed skepticism toward letting lower classes vote after observing the United States.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

This leaves us with thin citizenship extended to many (but still not most) people.

Rousseau says we can do better because human nature isn’t inevitably selfish.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

Participation and deliberation will be good for citizens as well as society... if they are placed in a cooperative social context... which is likely small and homogeneous.

The Social Contract and the Emergence of Liberal Democracy

For J.S. Mill, this can be scaled up.

Civic virtue is a product of the institutions we create, not a trait people either do or don’t have.

The Social Contract(s)

Hobbes

Locke

Rousseau

So where does this leave us?

Fundamental question: who governs?

This depends on your answers to:

  • Who should govern?
  • Who can govern?

Until relatively recently, the answer was: some people.

Why does this matter?

The U.S. founding and history is full of tensions between these evolving ideas about competence and citizenship.

Are citizens responsible for…

  • voting?
  • participating?

Why does this matter?

The U.S. founding and history is full of tensions between these evolving ideas about competence and citizenship.

Does expanding citizenship…

  • overburden the incapable and detract from the common good?
  • broaden society’s perspective and provide more checks on self-interest?

Why does this matter?

The U.S. founding and history is full of tensions between these evolving ideas about competence and citizenship.

Are political knowledge and civic virtue…

  • traits we either do or don’t have?
  • resources we can cultivate?

Democratic Citizenship in the United States

Scholars often call citizenship in the United States “thin”

Our institutions reflect the (small-l) liberal democratic social contract tradition

Emphases:

  • indirect input on decisions via voting
  • protection of private rights / “negative freedoms” (i.e. freedoms from)
  • few responsibilities oriented toward the public good

Democratic Citizenship in the United States

But key features of our society (public education, e.g.) take after Rousseau.

Think about what it means that we frown upon being completely ignorant of politics.

Plenty of evidence that U.S. citizens want to participate.

Democratic Citizenship in the United States

“…education is not a prerequisite to political control — political control is the cause of popular education.” - W.E.B. Du Bois

Democratic Citizenship in the United States

This suggests a patchwork conception of democratic citizenship – thin for some people in some contexts; thick for some in others

Values both public good and pursuit of private interest

Opportunities to participate in ways more involved than voting…if you want.

Democratic Citizenship in the United States

All this is to say, we treat political knowledge and civic virtue as resources…without cultivating and distributing them.

Result: unequal distribution of information, knowledge, and opportunity for authentic self-rule.

Civic Virtue as a Collective Action Problem

Civic virtue as a resource we collectively cultivate –> information/participation becomes a matter of collective action

How so? Think of some direct/immediate individual costs…

  • Time to collect and process information
    • Developing coherent belief system takes effort
    • Evaluating candidates/issues takes effort
  • Time to discuss politics with peers
  • Time/resources to go vote
    • or contact representative, attend public meeting, protest, etc.

Civic Virtue as a Collective Action Problem

The benefits of participation tend to be indirect/collective. If you participate…

  • Your candidate you like might win/the one you don’t might lose
    • You need a bunch of other people like you to show up too
      • But the odds your vote is decisive are slim
    • If your candidate wins, they might move policy in your direction
  • Your protest might advance its cause
    • Odds are better if it’s a big movement
      • But the bigger it is, the less it hinges on you
  • Improved/shared understanding has limited direct material value

Civic Virtue as a Collective Action Problem

Result 1: “rational ignorance” (Downs 1957)

  • It’s a mystery why anyone participates!
    • But the fact that people still do is something to think about…
    • We’ll come back to this when we talk about public opinion and elections

Civic Virtue as a Collective Action Problem

Result 2: inequalities in information/participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996)

For some…

  • marginal cost of acquiring information is higher
  • marginal benefit of participation is lower

Numbers

This is Fine (?)

Consider:

  • Trivia isn’t politics
  • Elite representation
  • Parties reduce complexity
  • “Collective rationality”
  • “Low-information rationality”
  • Ignorance is bliss
  • Full information doesn’t exist

Why This is Not Fine

These points will come back later in the semester. They’re good points! But we shouldn’t be satisfied with them.

Capacity for civic virtue – i.e. how much we can expect from citizens – is a resource that can be cultivated and distributed.

One implication: the “democratic paradox” isn’t a paradox...the less capable citizens are, the less democratic society is.

Sound Familiar?

“We say easily, for instance, ‘The ignorant ought not to vote.’ We would say, ‘No civilized state should have citizens too ignorant to participate in government,’ and this statement is but a step to the fact: that no state is civilized which has citizens too ignorant to help rule it. Or, in other words, education is not a prerequisite to political control — political control is the cause of popular education.” - W.E.B. Dubois

Thoughts?

Let’s talk about Dubois a bit. What did you think?

Features of U.S. politics that are more or less democratic?

Anyway, happy Tuesday!

For next class, collective action:

  • “What is Political Science For?” Jane Mansbridge
  • “Did a 1982 book predict America’s decline?” Dylan Matthews (Vox)

Collective Action

Collective Action

Maximize Your Country’s Profit

Debrief

Alright, let’s talk about this.

  • What made this difficult?
  • What made this easier?
  • Rule changes?
    • Number of teams?
    • Varying costs?
    • Allowed to save what you don’t spend?
    • More than one commodity?
  • Winners or losers other than countries?
  • Real-world situations this lines up with?

Types of Collective Action Problems

We just explored a specific collective action problem. What are some broader categories?

  • Free rider
  • Tragedy of the commons
  • Prisoner’s dilemma
  • Principal-agent problem

Free Rider Problem

Occurs when individual contribution seen as unnecessary for public good production.

  • rational ignorance
  • group projects
  • academic peer review

Tragedy of the Commons

Occurs when cost to consume public good is absent/insufficient to moderate consumption.

  • deforestation
  • overfishing
  • air pollution

Prisoner’s Dilemma

P2 Stays Quiet P2 Confesses
P1 Stays Quiet 1 year, 1 year 10 years, Free
P1 Confesses Free, 10 years 5 years, 5 years

Variations

  • Repeated game
  • Losses or gains?
  • More than two players
    • Parking lot after the big game, e.g.

Student’s Dilemma

Haskell, Will. “A professor tested the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ on his students by bribing them with extra credit points.” Business Insider, July 17, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/professor-tests-prisoners-dilemma-on-his-students-2015-7

Principal-Agent Problem

Occurs when player delegating action (principal) and player to whom action is delegated (agent) have differing goals/incentives

  • bureaucracy (executive –> bureaucrats)
  • elections (voters –> politicians)
  • political campaigns (candidate –> consultants, volunteers)

Solutions to Collective Action Problems

Institutions!

  • Ability to monitor and sanction
  • Can vary in how formal they are
  • Benefit from repeated iterations
    • Norms develop over time
    • Allows for coordination
    • Actors develop reputations

Examples of Institutions?

  • Congress
  • the IRS
  • political parties
  • political ideologies

Coercion

Institutions limit some behaviors (coercion) to enable others (cooperation)

Rewards

  • Incentivize good performance
    • tax credits for behavior
  • Privatization (property rights backed by state)

Sanction

  • Compel contribution
    • taxes for revenue
  • Regulation

Path-Dependence

Results of coordination can stick long after they become inefficient:

  • imperial measurement
  • UK + colonies driving on left (wrong) side of the road
  • QWERTY keyboard

Reflects power dynamics present at time of coordination. QWERTY, e.g., due to merger of five largest typewriter companies in 1893.

Costs of Solving Collective Action Problems

Two main ones (shout them out):

  • Transaction costs
  • Conformity costs

Examples of each? In the context of your Orange Juice Production Bureaus?

At Duke?

Costs of Solving Collective Action Problems

What are some collective action problems that come up on campus?

What’s for lunch?

What are some effective institutions that help overcome those collective action problems?

When is a time you free rode?

Ever used Wikipedia?

What are some collective action problems that come up in U.S. politics?

Collective action is everywhere!

Let’s talk about what you read

“…the challenge of creating legitimate coercion is at least as great as the challenge of resisting illegitimate coercion.” - Jane Mansbridge

Let’s talk about what you read

Negotiation

  • Why does Mansbridge like negotiation?
  • Normative and empirical challenges?

Transparency…sometimes bad?

Deliberation, negotiation, and majority rule

Let’s talk about what you read

Someone explain the “Mancur Olson Doom Loop”

Examples?

  • American Medical Association
    • Who wants to argue we should pay heart surgeons less?
  • Jones Act
    • Who wants to argue we shouldn’t hire U.S. workers?
  • Tax filing companies
    • They actually took an L recently

Let’s talk about what you read

Extended by James Q. Wilson…

Benefits Concentrated Benefits Diffuse
Costs Concentrated
Costs Diffuse

Let’s talk about what you read

Extended by James Q. Wilson…

Benefits Concentrated Benefits Diffuse
Costs Concentrated Interest Group Politics Entrepreneurial Politics
Costs Diffuse Client Politics Majoritarian Politics

Let’s talk about what you read

Extended by James Q. Wilson…

Benefits Concentrated Benefits Diffuse
Costs Concentrated Interest Group Politics Entrepreneurial Politics
Costs Diffuse Client Politics (Distributive Coalitions Win Here) Majoritarian Politics

For next class

The Constitution

  • Logic of American Politics, Chapter 2
  • The Federalist, 10 and 51